The obvious answer is the right answer. A good bail bondsman will contstructively provide themself with a daily regimen for many reasons. They have a business to run and there are many things that need to be taken care of throughout the day when running a business, especially a Bail Bonds company.

Bail Bondsman

A typical day starts out by arriving at the office. This is probably where things are a little different for this industry, the bail agent can set their own hours, so arriving at the office at 10am is fine. Some of the bail agents that we interviewed do the normal 8-5 or 9-5 or similar. Most of the office work is similar to other small business owners. Open the daily (junk) mail, sort between incoming money and bills. Check email and any pending emails that need follow up. After the normal office work is done, its time to get to the industry specific work.

If you’ve been in business for a while, you’ll have many file cabinets of files from all the people you’ve bailed out. All of these people usually fall in to a three categories; Payments pending, case pending, and exonerated.

Exonerated bonds

these are bonds where something has happened that the judge has ruled that the bond no longer carries any responsibilities and all parties are no longer responsible for the defendant. Usually it happens because the case has either been dismissed or the case has finished. The bond can be exonerated if the defendant is sentenced and incarcerated in a prison because their case was concluded.

Payments Pending

This is a bond that was written, is still in effect, and the defendent is currently paying off the premium that is charged for a bail bond. When a person uses a bail bonds company they pay a fee for their services. The state regulated fee for working with a bail bonds is 10% of the total bail at the time they bailed out. A $50K bail is $5000 to get bailed out using a bail bonds company. When the costs are that high, a lot of people usually don’t have that amount available and they work out a payment schedule with the company.

Case Pending

The reason a court assigns bail to a defendant is to provide a reason for them to return to court and attend their trial. Once the defendant bails out, they still have to attend a few court dates, whether to get their case dismissed or go to trial and finish the case out that way. During this time the defendant is considered “out on bail.”

 Back to the file cabinets and the work needed concerning the contents of these files. All of the previous scenarios need attending to:

For the bonds that have been exonerated, there’s paperwork with the courts that needs following up. Paperwork needs to be filed with the court showing the exonerated bond. If there was collateral issued by the defendant, this needs to be returned. If property was put up for collateral, i.e. Deed on their house, paper work needs to be filed with the county recorder to take the lien off the house. Paper work needs to be filed with the Surety (insurance company backing the bail bonds company) to show that they are relieved of the responsibility.

For the bonds that have payments pending, calls to the defendant need to be made to have them come in and make payments. Payments need to be filed and recorded in the bail bond’s software that organizes the records and payment schedules for the people out on bail.

For the bonds that have cases pending; each defendant has a “next” court date and its a good idea to call them and remind them. If they miss the court date, they are considered, FTA, or failed to appear, and their bond is now in default. This becomes a big problem if the defendant doesn’t quickly report to the court and set another court date. A warrant will also go out and if the defendant gets pulled over or for any reason a police officer runs their name, they get remanded to jail again and the judge might even set a new, higher bail. If the defendant misses the court date, the bail bonds company is quickly notified and the agent is on the phone calling to find out what happened or where the defendant is. Did they skip bail and start running, what was the reason for missing the court date? One can see that its a good idea for the bail agent to make sure the people they bailed out are notified of their next court dates.

If the company has a lot of clients (people they bailed out), they are usually on the phone quite a bit for the days at the office. Then there’s the normal job of bailing people out. Throughout the day the office will receive calls either from newly arrested individuals or friends or family of the people in jail. This is their primary job. A call will be taken and if the defendant qualifies for doing business with them, they will start the paper work needed for bailing them out. Qualifying means that, the defendant and the indemnitor (additional person signing responsibility for the defendant) need to be in good standing. They need to have relatively good credit scores and the best is if they own a house with some equity in it. The qualifications are usually most important for the indemnitor, since they are signing responsiblity for the bond. If the bond is $50K, the indemnitor usually needs to have collateral equalling that, unless their credit is squeaky clean, i.e. 750 fica or higher.

The bail calls can come at all hours of the day, so even when the bail agent leaves the office, their cell phone is still recieving forwarded calls from the office. People get arrested at any hour of the day and the most important task that a bail agent has is to field every call that comes in. One missed call can mean thousands of dollars to the agent. A bail agent’s job is really never done seeing that they are on call 24 hours a day. Its normal for a bail bonds company to have a few people on staff for this very reason. Imagine if you tried to run the business all by yourself, up all night dealing with bail calls or bailing someone out, then back to the office the next day facilitating all the paperwork and follow up calls, its possible that the agent wouldn’t get sleep for days. In the old days some bail bondsman would have cots or couches in their offices for late night naps. Nowadays with cell phones and better technology, agents can field calls from their house.

Bail Bondsman

Samuel Temmer is a bail licensee. As such, he acts as the agent of an Insurance company (called the Surety) which writes the bond guaranteeing performance (i.e., the appearance of a criminal defendant at a judicial proceeding). Temmer, as a bail licensee, executes the bond, collects the premium, and attempts to assure the criminal defendant’s appearance at the appropriate time and place.

Temmer collects the cost of the bond (10% of the total face amount of the bond(s)) form the defendant. A percentage of this is paid to the surety as a premium (fee). Although the surety is principally liable for the bond, it shifts ultimate liability for expenses and forfeitures to the bail licensee. To assure the bail licensee’s ability to pay, the bail licensee is required to pay an additional portion of the bond premium to a separate indemnity fund over which the surety acts as a trustee. Although a surety can agree to a suspension of contributions once the indemnity fund reaches a secure level, this did not happen with Temmer during the years at issue.

Only the surety has the right to withdraw funds from the indemnity fund. Temmer has no access to the fund so long as his agency agreement with the surety continues. Only upon termination and satisfaction of all other liabilities is the surety required to return the balance in the indemnity fund to Temmer. When a bail licensee terminates his/her agency status with one surety and acquires similar status with another, the indemnity fund is transferred to the successor surety.

Interest earned on the indemnity fund is accumulated in the fund. Temmer reported the interest as income on his return for the year earned.

In 2008, Temmer paid $47,000 into his indemnity fund. An additional $43,000 was paid in 2009. Temmer deducted these amounts as a portion of the cost of goods sold. He contends that, because the payments into the account are necessary for him to conduct business, he can deduct those payments in the years in which they were made. IRS denied the deductions on the ground that the payments are merely deposits to secure payment of the future liabilities. As such, they are non deductible until the surety draws from the account to satisfy a specific liability.

Denying the deduction, the Tax Court pointed to Zaninovich. There, the Eighth Circuit laid down a “one year rule” for purposes of currently deducting prepaid rent covering a period extending beyond the current year. (Section I-4521). Here, the payment into the indemnity fund had life far beyond one year. The funds were available to satisfy claims on bonds as long as the bonds were outstanding, which in some cases could mean as long as 15 years.

The Tax Court felt that IRS’ analogy to the rules for deducting contested or contingent liabilities (Section G2359) was closer to the mark. If payments to reserves for contested liabilities are deducted only as prescribed by special statutory rules, it follows that payments made with respect to liabilities that do not exist are not deductible.

In denying Temmer’s claimed deductions, the court noted that he ultimately retains the benefit of the indemnity fund. When his agreement with the surety ends, it is contractually obligated to return the balance in the account to him.

Alternatively, Temmer argued that the amounts paid into the indemnity fund should be excluded from income because they were not actually or constructively received. Rather, he contends that these funds were collected on behalf of the surety.

But the agreement with the surety shows that he earned these funds and set them aside as security for his promise to indemnify the surety. Amounts required to be deposited in an escrow or reserve account are includable if they are earned by the taxpayer and refundable after satisfying the requirements of the escrow or reserve.

“LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST

AB 59, as amended, Alpert. Bail: violent felonies. Existing law provides that, among other things, before any person who is arrested for a violent felony, as defined, is released on bail, which bail is set in an amount which is either more or less than the amount contained in the schedule of bail for that felony, a hearing shall be held in open court before the magistrate or judge, as specified. This bill would, in addition, require a hearing to be held before any person who is arrested for stalking, as defined, willful infliction of corporal injury on his or her spouse, battery on a former spouse, fiance, fiancee, or a person with whom there is a current or former dating relationship, or spousal rape, among others, is released on bail set in an amount that is more or less than the amount contained in the schedule of bail (or is released on his or her own recognizance).

Bail Bonds for Violent Crimes

Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. State-mandated local program: no.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. Section 1270.1 of the Penal Code is amended to read:

1270.1. Before any person who is arrested for a violent felony or a violation of Section 262, 273.5, or (649.9), or paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 243, is released on bail, in an amount that is either more or less than the amount contained in the schedule of bail for the offense, or is released on his or her own recognizance, a hearing shall be held in open court before the magistrate or judge. The prosecuting attorney shall be given a two court-day written notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter. The hearing required by this section shall be held within the time period prescribed in Section 825.

If the judge or magistrate sets the bail in an amount which is either more or less than the amount contained in the schedule of bail for the offense, the judge or magistrate shall state the reasons for that decision and shall address the issue of threats made against the victim or witness, if they were made, in the record. This statement shall be included in the record.

As used in this section, the term “violent felony” means any crime specified in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.

 The listed codes for what California considers a “violent felony” are described here. The Sections referred to herein are from the California Penal Code.

• PC 262 is Spousal Rape
• PC 273.5 is Corporal Injury of Spouse, Cohabitant, Former Spouse or Cohabitant or mother of father of his or her child
• PC 243: Paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 243: “When a battery is committed against a spouse, a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of
  the defendant’s child, former spouse, fianc, or fiance, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating or engagement relationship, the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of the sentence is suspended, it shall be a condition thereof that the defendant participate in, for no less than one year, and successfully complete, a batterer’s treatment program, as described in Section 1203.097, or if none is available, another appropriate counseling program designated by the court. However, this provision shall not be construed as requiring a city, a county, or a city and county to provide a new program or higher level of service as contemplated by Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution.”
• “violent felony” means any crime specified in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5. The Sections referred to herein are from the California Penal Code
• (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter.
  (2) Mayhem.
  (3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 or paragraph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.
  (4) Sodomy as defined in subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 286.
  (5) Oral copulation as defined in subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 288a.
  (6) Lewd or lascivious act as defined in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288.
  (7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.
  (8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in Section  12022.7, 12022.8, or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to July 1, 1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses
  a firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 12022.3, or Section 12022.5 or 12022.55.
  (9) Any robbery.
  (10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 451.
  (11) Sexual penetration as defined in subdivision (a) or (j) of Section 289.
  (12) Attempted murder.
  (13) A violation of Section 18745, 18750, or 18755.
  (14) Kidnapping.
  (15) Assault with the intent to commit a specified felony, in
  violation of Section 220.
  (16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5.
  (17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215.
  (18) Rape, spousal rape, or sexual penetration, in concert, in violation of Section 264.1.
  (19) Extortion, as defined in Section 518, which would constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
  (20) Threats to victims or witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1, which would constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
  (21) Any burglary of the first degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary.
  (22) Any violation of Section 12022.53.
  (23) A violation of subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11418. The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes merit special consideration when imposing a  sentence to display society’s condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.

Any arrest due to any of these charges results in a booking and jail incarceration. The bail bonds might be initially set by the Police officer according to the local bail schedule, but according to this amendment, the defendant will not be allowed to bail out until they see the judge. At this point the judge will review the charges against the defendant, any past criminal history, any current criminal history, the defendant’s general history, life in the community, where they live, flight risks, where their immediate family is, if the immediate family has any criminal record, and various other information that the Prosecutor and Defending Attorney bring up in the arraignment.

At the end of this court apparence, the just may decide in one of three ways; 1) remand the defendant to jail with no bail 2) Increase the bail amount, and 3) decrease the bail amount. This decision is based solely on the previously mentioned information.

This context suggests strongly that the first Congress acted extremely purposefully in substantially adopting the English method of tripartite protection against bail abuses. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive bail meant that bail bonds might not be excessive in these instances where Congress has deemed it proper to permit bail. The Congress then enacted the Judiciary Act defining what offenses would be bailable. Habeas corpus protection was afforded by Post I from the Constitution.

Bail Bonds

The argument that the excessive bail clause guarantees a right to bail by essential implication and that the provision forbidding excessive bail would be meaningless if judges could deny bail altogether in some instances is clearly not valid in this historical context. Exactly the same Congress which drafted the Eighth Amendment enacted the Judiciary Act which particularly denied a right to bail to individuals charged with a capital offense.

In the context of its legislative history, the Eighth Amendment is illuminated by reading it in conjunction with the Judiciary Act of 1789. The first Congress adopted the Amendment to prevent judges from setting excessive bail in cases prescribed as bailable by Congress. The same legislators then enacted a bill prescribing which offenses could be bailable. The Eighth Amendment, therefore, isn’t self-executing. It requires legislation creating legal entitlements to bail to give it effect. Recognizing this, the first Congress provided almost simultaneously the legislation that gave the Amendment impact. The first Congress did not select a strange legal arrangement; it chose precisely the system most familiar to these former English citizens. The very first Congress recognized that the Amendment was not intended to limit congressional discretion to determine the instances for which bail could be allowed, but was designed to circumscribe the authority of courts to ignore or circumvent that congressional policy with excessive bail requirements.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 didn’t differentiate between bail before and after conviction. Not till 1946 within the Federal Guidelines of Criminal Process was this distinction clearly produced. Rule 46 made the 1789 Act’s language the standard for release, but left release following conviction pending an appeal or application for certiorari to the judge’s discretion regardless of the crime.

In 1966 Congress enacted the very first major substantive change in federal bail law since 1789. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 offers that a non-capital defendant “shall.., be ordered released pending trial on his individual recognizance” or on individual bond unless the judicial officer determines that these incentives will not adequately assure his look at trial XXVIII. In that case, the judge must select the least restrictive alternative from a list of circumstances designed to guarantee look. That list consists of restrictions on travel, execution of an look bond (refundable when the defendant appears), and execution of a bail bond with a adequate number of solvent sureties. Individuals charged having a capital offense or who’ve been convicted and are awaiting sentencing or appeal are topic to a different regular. They are to be released unless the judicial officer has “reason to believe” that no circumstances “will reasonable assure that the person will not flee or pose danger to any other person or to the community.

The 1966 Act thus created a presumption for releasing a suspect with as little burden as necessary to be able to insure his appearance at trial. Look of the defendant for trial is the sole regular for weighing bail choices. In noncapital instances, the Act doesn’t permit a judge to think about a suspect’s dangerousness to the community. Only in capital cases or after conviction will be the judge authorized to weigh threats to community safety.

This aspect of the 1966 Act drew criticism particularly in the District of
Columbia where all crimes formerly fell under the regulation of Federal bail law.
Inside a considerable number of instances, persons accused of violent crimes
committed extra crimes while released on their own personal recognizance.
Furthermore, these people had been often released again on nominal bail.

The problems associated with the 1966 Bail Reform Act were regarded as by the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation from the Bail Reform Act within the District of Columbia in Might 1969. The committee was especially bothered by the release of potentially harmful noncapital suspects permitted by the 1966 law and recommended that even in noncapital cases, a person’s dangerousness be regarded as in figuring out conditions for release. Congress went together with the suggestions put forth in the committee’s proposals and changed the 1966 Bail Reform Act because it applied to persons charged with crimes in the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 allowed judges to think about dangerousness towards the community in addition to risk of flight when setting bail in noncapital instances. The 1970 Act contained numerous safeguards against irrational application from the dangerousness provisions. For instance, an individual couldn’t be detained prior to trial under the act unless the court finds that (1) there is clear and convincing evidence that he falls into certainly one of the categories topic to detention below the act, (2) no other pretrial release conditions will reasonably assure community safety, and (3) there is substantial probability that the suspect committed the crime for which he has been arrested. This final finding was an overzealous exercise of legislative precaution. The Justice Department testified that the burden of meeting this “substantial probability” requirement was the principal reason cited by prosecutors for the failure over the final 10 years to request pretrial detention hearings under the statute. Such a standard also had the effect of creating the pretrial detention hearing a car for pretrial discovery from the Government’s case and harassment of witnesses. Furthermore, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in its Edwards XXIX. decision strongly suggests that the probable cause standard regularly sustained by the Supreme Court as a basis for imposing “significant restraints on liberty” could be constitutionally sufficient in the context of pretrial detention.

The language from the English Bill of Rights was only 1 component of the bailmethod developed via many years of English law. As Caleb Foote has explained and this evaluation recounts, English protection against unjustifiable detention contained 3 essential components: first, offenses had been categorized as bailable or not bailable by statutes beginning with Westminster I which also placed limits on which judges and officials could impact the statue; second, habeas corpus procedures were developed as an effective curb on imprisonment with out particular charges; and third, the excessive bail clause from the 1689 bill of Rights protected against judicial officers who may abuse bail policy by setting excessive monetary circumstances for release. English law by no means contained an absolute right to bail. Bail could always be denied when the legislature determined particular offenses were unbailable. The majority of the history of bail law following Westminster I was an attempt to improve the efficiency of current law and especially to grant the suspect a meaningful opportunity to satisfy bail conditions when he had committed those offenses that the legislature had declared bailable.

Bail Bonds

In colonial America, bail law was patterned following the English law. While some colonies initiated their own laws which had been extremely comparable to English statutes, other people merely assured their subjects exactly the same protections guaranteed to British citizens. When the colonies became independent in 1776, however, they could no longer merely insure the protections of English law. Accordingly, the colonies enacted particular bail laws. Typical from the early American bail laws were these enacted in Virginia perpetuating the bail system because it had evolved in England. Section 9 of Virginia’s Constitution in 1776 declared merely that “excessive bail ought not to be required XX. “~ This constitutional provision was supplemented in 1785 having a statute which eliminated judges; discretion to grant bail by specifying that: these shall be let to bail who’re apprehended for any crime not punishable in life or limb… But if a crime be punishable by life or limb, or if it be manslaughter and there be good trigger to think the party guilty thereof, he shall not be admitted to baiI”xx. Thus the Virginia laws closely paralleled the English method. Statutes defined which offenses were bailable while the Constitution protected against abuses of these definitions. Actually, the clause within the Virginia Constitution was identical towards the one within the English Bill of Rights which had been included to prevent judges from unreasonable holding those accused of bailable offenses by setting bail so high as to be unobtainable. Other State constitutions similarly proscribed excessive bail for bailable offenses to be able to prevent this technique of thwarting the bail laws passed by the legislatures: for instance, section 29 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 supplied that “Excessive bail shall not be exacted for bailable offenses XXI.

With James Madison designated to prepare an initial draft for Bill of Rights in 1789, the Virginia constitution, often known as the Virginia Bill of Rights, became the model for the very first ten amendments that passed congress in 1789 and had been ratified in 1791. The Eighth Amendment in this Bill of Rights was taken virtually verbatim from Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution and provided that “Excessive bail shall not be needed…” The only comment on the clause during the congressional debates was produced by the perplexed Mr. Livermore:
“The clause seems to have no meanin9 to it, I don’t think it essential. What’s meant by the terms excessive bail…! XXII Indeed, it appears the drafters thought relatively small concerning the meaning from the bail clause; the clause was so rooted in American and English history that to most, the meaning was obvious. Like the identical clause within the English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Constitution, the Eighth Amendment bail provision was intended to prohibit excessive bail as a indicates of holding suspects accused of offenses deemed bailable by Congress.

The bail clause within the Eighth Amendment was only 1 part of the American bail structure XXIII. As in England, the American system also includes guarantees against imprisonment without informing the suspect of his crime. The Sixth Amendment towards the Constitution, like the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1678, insures that when arrested, a man “be informed of the nature and trigger from the accusation” thereby enabling him to demand bail if he has committed a bailable offense. The final part of the American bail structure and the element upon which the Constitution provisions are based is the statutory codification of justice officials’ power concerning bail and also the categorization of crimes into bailable and nonbailable offenses. The Constitution merely guarantees that excessive bail may not be employed to hold suspects who by law are entitled to bail; similarly the Sixth Amendment enables prisoners to understand if they are in fact entitled to bail under the law; it doesn’t give them any right to bail not already current within the law. Therefore, the legislature and not the Constitution is the real framer of bail law; the constitution upholds and protects against abuse from the system which the legislature creates. This principle was nicely understood by the Framers of the Bill of Rights. Actually, exactly the same Congress that proposed the Eighth Amendment also formulated the fundamental bail statute that remained in force till 1966. This was accomplished in 1789, exactly the same year that the Bill of Rights was introduced, when Congress passed the Judiciary Act. The Act specified which types of crimes were bailable and set bounds on the judges’ discretion in setting bail. Following the tradition of State laws created throughout the colonial period which in turn had been based on English law XXIV. The Judiciary Act stated that all no capital offenses had been bailable and that in capital offenses, the decision to detain a suspect before trial was left as much as the judge:

Upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail bonds shall be admitted, except exactly where punishment might be by death, in which instances it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or perhaps a circuit court, or by a justice from the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall physical exercise their discretion therein, concerning the nature and circumstance from the offense, and from the evidence, the usages of law XXV. The sequence of events in the Initial Congress pertaining to American bail policy is crucial to an understanding of the Framers of the Eighth Amendment and also the Judiciary Act of 1789. Only a couple of days after final passage from the Bill of Rights in Congress on September 21, 1789, and prior to its final adoption, the very first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 on September 29, 1789. In fact, these two legislative measures had been debated nearly concurrently. Considerable debate time was consumed in the House of Representatives over the issue of which ought to be enacted initial, the bill making a federal judiciary and federal judicial procedures or the amendments towards the Constitution. Eventually Madison’s point of view that the Bill of Rights ought to take precedence to ensure that “the independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves…the guardians of these rights” XXVI prevailed. However the same day the House completed the Bill of Rights it proceeded to ideal the Judiciary Act of 1789 which was already approved by the Senate. The two legislative proposals passed each other going and coming in between the House and the Senate. This historical footnote illuminates significantly the context in which these measures were debated. They were almost regarded as simultaneously. Frequently representatives argued that changes in one measure were unnecessary because the other supplied ample protection for vital rights XXVII.

Check in tomorrow for Part 3 (4/27/12)

In medieval England, methods to insure the accused would appear for trial began as early as criminal trials themselves. Till the 13th century, nevertheless, the circumstances under which a defendant could be detained before trial or released with guarantees that he would return had been dictated by the local sheriffs’ As the regional representative of the crown, the sheriff possessed sovereign authority to release or hold suspects. The sheriffs, in other words, could use any standard and weigh any element in determining whether or not to admit a suspect to bail bonds. -This broad authority was not usually judiciously administered. Some sheriffs exploited the bail method for their own gain. Accordingly, the absence of limits on the power of the sheriffs was stated as a major grievance top to the Statue of Westminster. I

The Statute of Westminster in 1275 eliminated the discretion of sheriffs with respect to which crimes would be bailable. Below the Statute, the bailable and non-bailable offenses were particularly listed XXI. The sheriffs retained the authority to decide the amount of bail and to weigh all relevant elements to arrive at that amount. The Statute, however, was far from a universal right to bail. Not just were some offenses explicitly excluded from bail, but the statutes restrictions were confined to the abuses of the sheriffs. The justices from the realm were exempt from its provisions.

Applicability of the statute to the judges was the key problem several centuries later when bail law underwent its subsequent main alter. Within the early seventeenth century, King Charles I received no funds from the Parliament. Consequently, he forced some noblemen to problem him loans. These who refused to lend the sovereign money had been imprisoned with out bail. Five incarcerated knights filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that they could not be held indefinitely without trial or bail. The King would neither bail the prisoners nor inform them of any charges against them. The King’s cause for keeping the charges secret had been evident: the charges had been illegal; the knights had no obligation to lend towards the King. When the case was brought prior to the court, counsel for the knights argued that with out a trial or conviction, the petitioners had been becoming detained solely on the basis of an unsubstantiated and unstated accusation. Attorney General Heath contended that the King could greatest balance the interests of individual liberty against the interests of state security when exercising his sovereign authority to imprison. The court upheld this sovereign prerogative argument XI.

Parliament responded towards the King’s action and the court’s ruling with the Petition of Right of 1628. The Petition protested that contrary towards the Magna Carta as well as other laws guaranteeing that no man be imprisoned with out due procedure of law, the King had lately imprisoned individuals prior to trial “without any trigger showed.” The Petition concluded that “no freeman, in any manner as prior to mentioned, be imprisoned or detained… “~ The act guaranteed, consequently, that man could not be held prior to trial on the basis of an unspecific accusation. This didn’t, nevertheless, provide an absolute right to bail. The offenses enumerated within the Statute of Westminster remained bailable and non-bailable. Consequently, an person charged with a non-bailable offense still could not contend that he had a legal entitlement to bail.

The King, the courts and the sheriffs were able to frustrate the intent from the Petition of Right through procedural delays in granting the writs of habeas corpus. In 1676, for example, when Francis Jenkes sought a writ of habeas corpus concerning his imprisonment for the vague charge of “sedition”, it was denied at first because the court was “outside term”, and later simply because the case was not calendared; furthermore, when the court was requested to calendar the case, it refused to complete so. In response to the rampant procedural delays in providing habeas corpus as evidenced by Jenkes Case~” Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1677. The act strengthened the guarantee of habeas corpus by specifying that a magistrate:

shall discharge the said Prisoner from his Imprisonment taking his or their Recognizance, with one or much more Surety or Sureties, in any Sum based on their discretion, having regard towards the High quality of the Prisoner and Nature from the offense, for his or their Look within the Court from the King’s bench… unless it shall appear….that the Party (is)… committed….for such Matter or offenses for which by law the Prisoner is not bailable XVI.

By requiring early designation from the cause for arrest, the Habeas Corpus Act provided a suspect with knowledge that the alleged offense was either bailable or not. The Statute of Westminster remained the main definition of what offenses could be eligible for bail.

Even though the Habeas Corpus Act improved administration of bail laws, it supplied no protection against excessive bail specifications. Even if a suspect was accused of a bailable offense and therefore was entitled to some bail, he could nonetheless be detained when the financial condition of release was exorbitantly high. As evidence of this abuse reached Parliament, it responded with the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Within the Preamble, the bill accused the King of attempting “to subvert…the laws and liberties of the kingdom: within the “excessive bail hath been needed of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws produced for the liberty from the subjects7~c~~lI The Bill of Rights proposed to remedy the scenario by declaring “that excessive bail ought not to be needed.”~””’ Therefore, the precursor from the Eighth Amendment within the U.S. Constitution was drafted to prevent those accused of bailable offenses from unreasonable bail specifications. It didn’t alter the categories of bailable crimes discovered in the separate Statute of Westminster and certainly did not guarantee a right to bail.

tune in tomorrow for Part 2

Adam Gardenhire,18, was arrested this morning at his North Hollywood residence without incident. Gardenhire was named in a two-count indictment filed yesterday in United States District Court in Los Angeles that alleges he pointed the beam of a laser at a private plane and a police helicopter.

The federal statute used to charge Gardenhire is part of new legislation recently signed into law by President Obama that makes it a federal crime to deliberately point a laser at an aircraft. The indictment marks the second time a violation of the new statute has been charged in the United States, and the first time one has been charged on the West Coast.

According to the indictment, Gardenhire deliberately aimed a commercial-grade green laser at multiple aircraft on the evening of March 29, 2012. The laser attack was initially reported by a pilot operating a privately owned Cessna Citation. The indictment further alleges that the beam of Gardenhire’s laser was pointed at a helicopter operated by a pilot with the Pasadena Police Department who was responding to the report of the laser attack on the Cessna. Air and ground investigators with the Los Angeles Police Department and the Pasadena Police Department identified Gardenhire as a suspect later that evening, and Gardenhire was taken into custody on state charges of pointing a laser at an aircraft. Gardenhire subsequently posted bail and was released from local custody while the joint investigation continued.

Hollywood Bail Bonds Company: Now a Federal crime, pointing lasers at aircrafts can be very costly. Sure, the 18 year old kid probably thinks its pretty funny that they can hit a moving aircraft 100′s of fee away with their laser, but its a different story when the Police officers show up at their front door. For two Federal Charges, his bail is probably $50,000. To work with a bail bonds company, he would have to come up with $5000. That’s 10% of the total bail, a fee that is regulated by the California Department of Insurance. What’s interesting to note is, how the police found the location of the laser. It was reported by the Cessna and then the Police Copter saw it also. Did he just not realize he was pointing a laser at a police helicopter, and if he did, why did he continue long enough for them to pinpoint his location?

Reports of laser attacks have increased dramatically in recent years as laser devices have become more affordable and widely available to the public. In addition, technology has advanced the effectiveness of laser devices, with a resulting increase in the potential safety hazards for pilots operating aircraft and their passengers and crew. Such safety hazards include temporary distraction and impaired vision, which is particularly dangerous during the critical takeoff or landing phase of flight. In addition, pilots have reported the need to abort landings or relinquish control of the aircraft to another pilot as a result of laser attacks. California consistently leads the nation in reports of laser attacks. Over 3,500 laser attacks were reported in 2011.

Gardenhire is scheduled to make an initial appearance before a federal magistrate judge this afternoon in federal court in downtown Los Angeles.

If convicted of both charges in the indictment, Gardenhire faces a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in federal prison. Gardenhire is also subject to civil penalties by the Federal Aviation Administration.

San Bernardino, CA—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California today announced federal charges against 12 defendants for a variety of federal narcotics and firearms violations as part of an Inland Empire investigation known as Operation Squeeze Play. Ten of the 12 defendants are in custody this morning, and two defendants are currently being sought by authorities.

In 2011, an FBI Safe Streets Task Force known as the San Bernardino Gang Impact Team, which consists of members from the FBI; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); the San Bernardino Police Department; and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, initiated an investigation into the criminal activities of several San Bernardino based criminal street gangs, including the California Garden Crips and the Delmann Heights Bloods. According to investigators, the California Garden Crips and the Delmann Heights Bloods street gangs play a major role in the distribution of illegal narcotics in and around the city of San Bernardino, California. The members and associates of the two gangs are believed to actively sell narcotics to further the influence of the gang.

“The Department of Justice is committed to aggressively pursuing gang members and narcotics traffickers that threaten the safety of our local communities,” said United States Attorney André Birotte, Jr., whose office is handling the prosecution of the case. “The United States Attorney’s Office will continue working together with our partners at both the federal and local levels in order to take these dangerous offenders off our streets. When violent crime and narcotics trafficking are reduced, then all of our communities and neighborhoods benefit.”

A 42-page federal indictment based on the work of the Gang Impact Team was unveiled today, and it names seven defendants, all of whom are charged with conspiracy to distribute various illegal narcotics, including methamphetamine and crack cocaine. Three other defendants are named in a second criminal complaint, and two individuals are named in single-defendant criminal complaints. In total, Operation Squeeze Play has resulted in federal charges against 12 defendants.

“The activity alleged in the indictment outlines the vast reach of drug networks operating in and around the city of San Bernardino—activity that has perpetuated a gang culture among neighborhood youth and has fueled the spread of violence in the area,” said Steven M. Martinez, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “Today’s arrests by the Gang Impact Team will have a strong impact on the gang’s influence and are a positive step toward restoring order to law-abiding citizens.”

“Among those arrested during this morning’s operation were gang members or associates identified based on persistent criminal activity that has plagued our streets for too long,” said Robert Handy, Chief of the San Bernardino Police Department. “Today’s operation demonstrates our commitment to the residents of San Bernardino who deserve to live without fear and to raise families in safe communities.”

The federal indictment alleges 23 counts, and all seven defendants named in that indictment are charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, crack cocaine, and/or marijuana. Some of the defendants listed in the indictment and the three complaints are additionally charged with distribution of methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and/or felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

If convicted, all seven defendants named in the indictment face potential maximum sentences of lifetime imprisonment and mandatory minimum sentences of at least five years of imprisonment. The five defendants charged by way of complaint potentially face maximum sentences of at least 40 years of imprisonment and mandatory minimum sentences of at least five years of imprisonment.

An indictment and a criminal complaint only contain allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in court.

The following agencies provided support during the investigation and today’s arrests: the FBI, DEA, ATF, San Bernardino Police Department, and San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department.

The federal charges are being prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office. Those persons taken into custody this morning will be arraigned on the indictment and/or the complaints this afternoon in United States District Court in Riverside.

OAKLAND, CA—For conspiring to obstruct an investigation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Nasser V. Hamedani and Sholeh A. Hamedani were sentenced yesterday to 25 months and 20 months, respectively, in prison, United States Attorney Melinda Haag announced. They were also ordered to perform a total of 1,750 hours of community service as part of their two-year terms of supervised release.

The defendants, father and daughter, pled guilty on November 9, 2011 to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371-conspiracy to obstruct justice. According to the plea agreement, the Hamedanis admitted to making false statements while under oath and producing fraudulent documents in order to impede and obstruct the SEC’s investigation into the registration and sales of securities issued by the company known as The Children’s Internet Inc. (TCI). TCI was an Internet start-up company based in San Ramon, California that was in the process of developing and marketing software to protect and secure children’s access to the Internet.

Nasser Hamedani, 74, and Sholeh Hamedani, 44, both residents of Antioch, California, were indicted by a federal grand jury on May 12, 2009. A superseding indictment was returned on July 21, 2009. The two defendants were charged with conspiracy, securities fraud, false statements to accountants, false books and records, and obstruction of justice.

“Obstructing the SEC from carrying out its mission to protect investors and the integrity of the financial markets is a serious offense with serious consequences,” U.S. Attorney Haag said. “This investigation demonstrates the U.S. Attorney’s office’s commitment to prosecuting individuals who make false statements and fabricate documents in response to investigations by our enforcement partners at the SEC.”

In addition to their criminal convictions, the Hamedanis remain subject to final judgments entered by U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken on October 23, 2008 in the SEC’s civil action. According to those judgments, the Hamedanis were held jointly and severally liable for disgorgement and prejudgment interest of approximately $4.0 million and were each fined $100,000 in civil penalties. The final judgments also impose permanent injunctions against the Hamedanis from violating certain provisions of the federal securities laws, prohibit them from serving as an officer or director of a publicly reporting company, and prohibit them from engaging in penny stock transactions.

Both sentences were handed down by Judge Wilken following guilty pleas on count 10 of the superseding indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1505. Judge Wilken also sentenced the defendants to a two-year period of supervised release with conditions including 90 days in a halfway house, community service, and restrictions on their financial activities. The judge also set a restitution hearing for May 22, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. in order to accommodate the large number of victims with potential claims against the defendants and coordinate any restitution with the existing final judgments.

Timothy J. Lucey is the Assistant U.S. Attorney who is prosecuting the case with the assistance of Elise Etter. The prosecution is the result of a two-year investigation by the FBI with the substantial assistance of the SEC’s San Francisco Regional Office.

A suspect who committed at least seven street robberies while impersonating a police officer is in custody, but Detectives believe there may be additional victims.

Beginning on September 16, 2009, the suspect, 42-year-old George Turegano of Fontana, began committing street robberies by walking up to, or at times driving up behind his victims, and identifying himself as a police officer. He dressed in plain clothes, wore a badge around his neck, had a set of handcuffs, and was armed with a handgun.

Turegano’s method of operation would be to detain the victims, at times by handcuffing them, and search their person and cars. During the searches he would take the victims money before running or driving off. He was seen driving a gray 2005 Chevy Suburban and a gray 2004 Chrysler Sebring.

Turegano was arrested by Robbery Homicide Detectives on August 10, 2010 for the robberies listed below:

1. September 16, 2009, 6th Street & Bonnie Brae Avenue
2. June 4, 2010, 3400 block of 15th Street
3. June 19, 2010, 2900 block of Barranca Avenue
4. June 30, 2010, 8th Street and Union Avenue
5. July 18, 2010, 11th Street and Burlington Avenue
6. July 18, 2010, 1400 block of South Bonnie Brae Avenue

Turegano was released on bail during his criminal proceedings, on March 3, 2012 he committed another street robbery at 7th Street and Mateo Avenue using the same method of operation.

On April 2, 2012, officers assigned to the LAPD/FBI Fugitive Task Force re-arrested Turegano for robbery. He is currently being held on $575,000 bail. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office has filed an additional count of robbery against Turegano.
Turegano is a male Hispanic, black hair, brown eyes, 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighing 220 pounds.
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NR12171kr3Anyone with information about these or similar crimes that may have gone unreported are asked to contact Robbery-Homicide Division, Detective Freddy Arroyo at (213) 486-6840. During non-business hours or on weekends, calls should be directed to 1-877-LAPD-24-7 (877-527-3247). Anyone wishing to remain anonymous should call Crime Stoppers at 1-800-222-TIPS (800-222-8477). Tipsters may also contact Crime Stoppers by texting to phone number 274637 (C-R-I-M-E-S on most keypads) with a cell phone. All text messages should begin with the letters “LAPD.” Tipsters may also go to LAPDOnline.org, click on “webtips” and follow the prompts.